"...it was never the intention of the law that a sheer proclamation of a candidate automatically removes from the Commission its prerogative to rectify and nullify the patently illegal acts of the PBOC." - Comelec En Banc
Extracts from the Comelec Resolution in the matter of
declaring null and void the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBOC) of Marinduqe and the subsequent proclamation of Regina O. Reyes as
member of the House of Representative in the Lone District of Marinduque. Filed
by Petitioner Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco. (SPC No. 13-010)
“As held in Mastura v.
Comelec
“Pursuant to its
administrative functions the COMELEC exercises direct supervision and control
over the proceedings before the Board of Canvassers in Aratuc v. Commission on
Elections we held –
“While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the
Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite
loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by the Court…
as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission
in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction
conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct
control and supervision endowed to it by the above quoted provisions
of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate
to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office, having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is
supposed to do or ought to have done.” (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
“Clearly,
therefore contrary to the assertion of the Respondent, the Commission retains
jurisdiction to determine the validity and propriety of the acts of the PBOC. In
this regard, it was never the intention of the law that a sheer proclamation of
a candidate automatically removes from the Commission its prerogative to
rectify and nullify the patently illegal acts of the PBOC.
Corollary thereto, it likewise is inconceivable to consider that HRET will have
the jurisdiction to review the acts of PBOC after it proclaimed a winning
candidate.
“In Codilla v. De Venecia
the Supreme Court ruled that HRET has no jurisdiction to review the resolutions
of Comelec:
“In Puzon v. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal
ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed
office, it is the Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest
involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been
immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very
COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because HRET has no jurisdiction to
review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC whether issued by a division or
en banc.”
“Consequently, it is on the
basis of the Commission’s final and executory Decision that the petitioner asks
the Commission to exercise its ministerial duty to execute and implement the
same.
“Indeed, while the denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of COC generally necessitates the exercise of
the Commission’s quasi-judicial functions, when the grounds therefor are rendered
conclusive on account of final and executor judgments, such exercise falls
within the Commission’s administrative jurisdiction to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations – which is definitely outside the functions of the
HRET.
On another point, Section 17
of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the “sole
judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of (the House of Representatives’) Members.” Indeed, the subject of
inquiry is limited to election, returns
and qualifications. In the same vein, jurisdiction of the HRET may be
exercised only over the Members of the House of Representatives.
Here, respondent cannot be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives because (1) she has not
taken the proper oath required to be a member of the House of Representatives.
(2) she has not yet assumed office; and (3) her proclamation is invalid.
“In her Verified Answer,
respondent attached a purported oath of
office taken before Rosario P. Quiroz, the presiding judge of Branch 29,
Regional Trial Court of Manila. However, this is not the oath of office which
confers membership to the House of Representatives.
“Section 6 of the Rule II
(Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
“Section 6. Oath of Affirmation of
Members.
“Members shall take their
oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
“Consequently, before one
can be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, the oath must be
made (1) before the Speaker of the House and (2) must be made in open session.
Since Reyes has not done the same, she cannot be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives.”