Saturday, July 20, 2013

Comelec retains jurisdiction to determine validity and propriety of the acts of the PBOC (cont'd)


"...it was never the intention of the law that a sheer proclamation of a candidate automatically removes from the Commission its prerogative to rectify and nullify the patently illegal acts of the PBOC." - Comelec En Banc

Extracts from the Comelec Resolution in the matter of declaring null and void the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of Marinduqe and the subsequent proclamation of Regina O. Reyes as member of the House of Representative in the Lone District of Marinduque. Filed by Petitioner Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco. (SPC No. 13-010) 

“As held in Mastura v. Comelec

“Pursuant to its administrative functions the COMELEC exercises direct supervision and control over the proceedings before the Board of Canvassers in Aratuc v. Commission on Elections we held –

                                “While  nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by the Court… as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office, having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

“Clearly, therefore contrary to the assertion of the Respondent, the Commission retains jurisdiction to determine the validity and propriety of the acts of the PBOC. In this regard, it was never the intention of the law that a sheer proclamation of a candidate automatically removes from the Commission its prerogative to rectify and nullify the patently illegal acts of the PBOC. Corollary thereto, it likewise is inconceivable to consider that HRET will have the jurisdiction to review the acts of PBOC after it proclaimed a winning candidate.

“In Codilla v. De Venecia the Supreme Court ruled that HRET has no jurisdiction to review the resolutions of Comelec:

                                “In Puzon v.  Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is the Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC whether issued by a division or en banc.”

“Consequently, it is on the basis of the Commission’s final and executory Decision that the petitioner asks the Commission to exercise its ministerial duty to execute and implement the same.

“Indeed, while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC generally necessitates the exercise of the Commission’s quasi-judicial functions, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and executor judgments, such exercise falls within the Commission’s administrative jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws and regulations – which is definitely outside the functions of the HRET.

On another point, Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the “sole judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of (the House of Representatives’) Members.” Indeed, the subject of inquiry is limited to election, returns and qualifications. In the same vein, jurisdiction of the HRET may be exercised only over the Members of the House of Representatives.

Here, respondent cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because (1) she has not taken the proper oath required to be a member of the House of Representatives. (2) she has not yet assumed office; and (3) her proclamation is invalid.

“In her Verified Answer, respondent attached a purported oath of office taken before Rosario P. Quiroz, the presiding judge of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of Manila. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.

“Section 6 of the Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

                                “Section 6. Oath of Affirmation of Members.
“Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).


“Consequently, before one can be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, the oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House and (2) must be made in open session. Since Reyes has not done the same, she cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives.”